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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST BLACK VICTIMS IN
CAPITAL SENTENCING
In this article we analyze possible legislative and judicial alter-
natives for redressing prosecutorial race discrimination against
murder victims. There are both substantive and procedural ob-
stacles to such remedies. The substantive obstacle is the doctrine
that requires proof of intentional discrimination to make out a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The procedural obstacles
arise out of the standing doctrine and the law of official immunity.
We conclude that the most promising remedies are to commute
the death sentences of defendants whose victims' lives have been
overvalued on the basis of race and to award damages to the fami-
lies of murder victims whose lives have been undervalued on the
basis of race.
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I. MCCLESKEY V KEMP AND DISCRIMINATION IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING
We begin with McCleskey v Kemp' because, although the
scope of our inquiry considerably exceeds the factual radius of
McCleskey, the topic of prosecutorial race discrimination among
murder victims simply cannot be comprehended without reference
to that decision. In 1978, Warren McCleskey was sentenced to
death by a Georgia jury for the murder of a white police officer.
The killing occurred during the course of an armed robbery com-
mitted by McCleskey and three accomplices.2 McCleskey was "eli-
gible" for the death penalty because of two aggravating factors
found by the jury: the murder was committed during the course
of an armed robbery, and it was committed on a peace officer en-
gaged in the performance of his duties.' McCleskey eventually
brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court, arguing that "the Georgia capital sentencing process is ad-
ministered in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. "4
McCleskey's primary evidence in support of this claim was the
so-called Baldus study, a sophisticated statistical analysis performed
by Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George
Woodworth of the role played by race in capital sentencing pro-
ceedings in Georgia in the 1970s. The Baldus study was based on
data from more than 2,000 Georgia murder cases during the rel-
evant period. It considered 230 potentially relevant, nonracial
variables that might explain disparities in capital sentencing. The
481 US 279 (1987).
2 Warren McCleskey was executed by the State of Georgia in 1991. See Peter Applebome,
Georgia Inmate Is Executed After "Chaotic" Legal Move, New York Times A18 (September
26, 1991). He had the dubious distinction of producing in the course of his appeals not
one but two Supreme Court decisions that were highly unfavorable to capital defendants.
See McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987); McCleskey v Zant, 499 US 467 (1991) (establish-
ing "abuse of writ" rule prohibiting defendants from filing successive federal writs of habeas
corpus, absent a showing of "cause and prejudice").
3 McCleskey, 481 US at 283-85.
4 Id at 286. This article will not discuss McCleskey's claim that racial discrimination in
capital sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment," primarily to keep our inquiry within manageable proportions, but also be-
cause we believe that both historically and doctrinally, the Equal Protection Clause offers
the best fit for addressing discrimination against black murder victims.
[1998
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Baldus study is generally accepted within the social scientific com-
munity as a thorough, carefully conducted analysis, and its results
as almost certainly statistically valid.'
The results of the Baldus study are striking. The race of the
victim was an overwhelmingly important indicator of the likeli-
hood that a capital sentence would be imposed. After controlling
for the thirty-nine most relevant nonracial variables, murderers of
whites were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as mur-
derers of blacks.6 The race of the defendant was hardly influential
at all: black defendants were only 1.1 times (i.e., 10%) more likely
to receive a death sentence than white defendants, and later writ-
ings by the authors of the Baldus study suggest that this result is
not statistically significant.' Furthermore, the Baldus study's find-
ings regarding the prevalence of race-of-victim discrimination in
capital sentencing (and indeed its findings regarding the lack of
race-of-defendant discrimination) are fully supported by other so-
cial scientific research.'
In addition to its findings regarding end-result discrimination,
the Baldus study also sheds light on the loci of discrimination
I See Randall L Kennedy, McCleskey v Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 Harv L Rev 1388, 1398-1400 and nn 40-47. It should be noted that while the
District Court in the McCleskey case questioned the validity of the study, both the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court assumed its validity. McCleskey, 481 US at 291 n 7.
Moreover, the grounds upon which the District Court questioned the study appear to have
been ill-informed, and almost certainly incorrect as a matter of statistical methodology. For
a discussion, see Kennedy, 101 Harv L Rev at 1400 and nn 44-45.
'McCleskey, 481 US at 287.
'See Kennedy (cited in note 5), 101 Harv L Rev at 1390-91 n 13 (citing David C.
Baldus, George Woodworth, and Charles Pulaski, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 Stetson L Rev
133, 158 (1986); Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary
Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 UC Davis L Rev 1375, 1404 (1985));
Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, Equal Justice and the Death Penalty 185 (1990) ("Statewide,
we see no evidence of race-of-defendant discrimination").
I In 1990, the General Accounting Office issued a report summarizing and analyzing
existing studies regarding the role played by racial factors in capital sentencing. U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities
(1990) ("GAO Report"), cited in Note, Easing the Fear of Too Much Justice: A Compromise
Proposal to Revise the Racial Justice Act, 30 Harv CR-CL L Rev 543, 543 and n 4 (1995).
After reviewing a large number of studies that themselves examined a variety of state systems
and spanned a time period from 1979 to 1990, the Report concluded unambiguously that
the findings of race-of-victim discrimination were "remarkably consistent." As with the
Baldus study, however, the studies were less likely to find race-of-defendant discrimination,
and if found, such discrimination was likely to be less serious. GAO Report at 5-6 (quoted
in Note, 30 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 544-45).
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within the capital sentencing system. While the study found dis-
crimination in every stage of the process,9 it found race to be par-
ticularly important in the charging decision made by prosecutors fol-
lowing a jury conviction for murder. Prosecutors were many times
more likely to seek the death penalty in a case involving a white
victim than in a case involving a black victim. Once again, these
results were statistically significant after being subjected to a multi-
variate regression analysis; ° and, once again, other research fully
confirms these findings."
Despite these results, the Supreme Court, as well as every other
court to hear the case, rejected McCleskey's claim of a constitu-
tional violation. 2 The basis for the Court's holding was that to
prove an equal protection violation, McCleskey was required to
"prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discrimi-
natory purpose." According to the Court, the statistical findings
of the Baldus study, without more, were inadequate to establish
purposeful discrimination. 3 The Court's primary objection to
McCleskey's claim appeared to be that he was unable to prove that
any of the specific actors in his case, whether it be the prosecutor,
judge, or jurors, had acted with discriminatory intent. According
to the Court, statistical evidence alone could not make out such
proof because, given the large number of factors that are poten-
tially relevant to the charging and sentencing decisions, there
9McCleskey, 481 US at 350-51 (Blackmun, J, dissenting); id at 356 n 11 (Blackmun, J,
dissenting).
" Id at 350-51, 356-57 (Blackmun,J, dissenting); Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, Equal
Justice and the Death Penalty 162 (1990); Note, Easing the Fear of Too Much justice: A Compro-
inise Proposal to Revise the Racial Justice Act, 30 Harv CR-CL L Rev 543, 549 n 22 (1995).
" See Kennedy, 101 Harv L Rev at 1435 n 213 (citing Joseph E. Jacoby and Raymond
Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Further Challenges to the Death Penalty,
73 J Crim L & Criminol 379 (1982); Raymond Pasternoster, Race of Victim and Location of
Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J Crim L & Criminol
754 (1983); Michael L. Radelet and Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in
Homicide Cases, 19 L & Society Rev 587 (1985)); Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, Equal
Justice and the Death Penalty 257 (1990) (citing Raymond Pasternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion
in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 L & Society
Rev 437 (1984); Elizabeth Lynch Murphy, Application of the Death Penalty in Cook County,
73 I1l Bar J 90 (1984)); Thomas J. Keil and Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty
in Kentucky Murder Trials: 1976-1991: A Study of Racial Bias as a Factor in Capital Sentencing,
http://dpa.state.ky.us/-rwheeler/archives/race/vito.txt, p. 8 (1995).
'
2 McCleskey, 481 US at 289-91.
I3 1d at 292-94.
[1998
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could be no confidence that race played a role in any particular
case. 4 In the Court's words, "[A]t most, the Baldus study indicates
a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race."'" The Court
asserted that the statistical evidence of the Baldus study did not
make out even a prima facie case that McCleskey himself was sub-
jected to racial discrimination "because a legitimate and unchal-
lenged explanation for the decision [to sentence McCleskey to
death] is apparent from the record: McCleskey committed an act
for which the United States Constitution and Georgia laws permit
imposition of the death penalty."16
Some implications quite plainly follow from the extensive race-
of-victim discrimination that exists in capital sentencing. First, if
the death penalty in fact has any deterrent value, then the disincli-
nation to impose the penalty in black-victim cases would tend to
increase the murder rate against blacks, and thus systematically
provide blacks less protection. 7 Second, even if the death penalty
does not deter, the disinclination to impose the penalty in black-
victim cases imposes intangible but important harms on black vic-
tims' families because it denies them the sense of closure and "jus-
tice" that the death penalty affords, and also stigmatizes them as
inferior in the eyes of the law. 8
4 Id at 295 and n 15.
I5 Id at 312. The Court's description of the study is inaccurate because a multivariate
regression shows more than a mere correlation; if the underlying model is properly specified
and relevant independent variables are properly included, as was apparently the case with
the Baldus study, such an analysis tends to show causation, since other possible explanations
have been accounted for and rejected by the model. For a more detailed discussion, see
Part I1.
11 Id at 297.
17 For similar arguments, see Kennedy, 101 Harv L Rev at 1425 (cited in note 5); Stephen
L. Carter, When the Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 Yale L J 444 (1998). Of course, the
deterrent effects of the death penalty remain highly controversial, with many studies con-
cluding that such effects are small or nonexistent. See Note (cited in note 8), 30 Harv CR-
CL L Rev at 547 and n 14 (citing Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 95-
185 (3d ed 1982); Walter Berns, For Capital Punishment: Crime and the Morality of the Death
Penalty 83-127 (1979); Mark Tushnet, The Death Penalty 5-10, 134 nn 5-8 (1994)); Ken-
nedy, 101 Harv L Rev at 1425 and n 171 (cited in note 5).
"A primary, if not the only, function performed by the death penalty in our society is
retributive-the death penalty serves to satisfy society's, and a victim's friends' and family's,
need for retribution and justice. Viewed in this light, the death penalty is a benefit that
the law dispenses to the survivors of murder victims, apparently in a highly discriminatory
manner.
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II. EQUAL PROTECTION AS PROTECTING EQUALLY:
THE PROBLEM OF INTENT
The systematic race-of-victim discrimination that infects
the administration of the death penalty would seem to seriously
implicate the equal protection rights of blacks who are potential
or actual victims of crime. Indeed, such discrimination conflicts
with one of the core, historical objectives of the Equal Protection
Clause, which was to require southern states to protect newly freed
slaves from private violence by southern whites, and to prosecute
those who engaged in violence against blacks in the same manner
that they prosecuted those who attacked whites. 9 But to establish
an actual violation of these rights, such black victims must satisfy
the "purposeful discrimination" requirement of McCleskey and the
Supreme Court's modern equal protection doctrine.
McCleskey rested on the "intent" requirement of modern equal
protection doctrine. Since its landmark decision in Washington v
Davis in 1976,20 the Supreme Court has consistently held that in
order to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based
on racial discrimination, a litigant must show that the state has
engaged in purposeful, or intentional, discrimination. Mere statis-
tical disparity, or unequal effect, will not suffice. Thus, in Arlington
Heights v Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,2 the Court rejected an
equal protection challenge to a city's zoning ordinance even
though it excluded low-income housing residents, a large percent-
age of whom were minorities (primarily blacks). More recently, in
" As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent in McCleskey, southern violence against
blacks was very much in the minds of the drafters of the Equal Protection Clause. See
McCleskey, 481 US at 346-47 and n 2 (Blackmun, J, dissenting) (quoting extensive testimony
before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of violence against blacks, and inaction by
state officials). Furthermore, just three years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress enacted legislation enforcing the Amendment, the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, which specifically targeted private southern violence against blacks. See Act of April
20, 1871, ch 22, 17 Stat 13; Briscoe v LaHue, 460 US 325, 337-38 (1983); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, The Nationalization of Civil Rights 166 and n 10 (1987); John Harrison, Recon-
structing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 101 Yale LJ 1385, 1427 and nn 213-15 (1992);
Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-a Historical Inquiry, 22 San Diego
L Rev 499, 521-22 (1985).
20 426 US 229 (1976). The Davis Court held that the Equal Protection Clause was not
violated by the Washington, D.C., Police Department's use of a written examination to
screen applicants, even though the test disqualified black applicants at a much higher rate
than whites.
2! 429 US 252 (1977).
[1998
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Personnel Administrator v Feeney,22 the Court held that a Massachu-
setts law granting a preference in state hiring to veterans did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause even though the law sharply
reduced the public employment opportunities available to women
(because the vast majority of eligible veterans are men). Crucially,
in Feeney the Court noted that it would not matter for equal pro-
tection purposes that the legislators knew at the time they adopted
the preference that the law would disadvantage women, so long
as it was not the reason for their decision. The Court explained
that the Equal Protection Clause would not be violated unless the
government acted "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite
of,' its adverse effect upon an identified group."2 3
The zenith of the "intent" standard-some would say the na-
dir 4 -was McCleskey. Justice Powell's majority opinion rejected
McCleskey's challenge to the Georgia death penalty system be-
cause he had failed to prove that he was the victim of intentional
discrimination,25 invoking the language in Feeney that intentional
discrimination must occur "because of," not merely "in spite of,"
race.26 In particular, the Court held that the purely statistical evi-
dence presented by McCleskey (i.e., the Baldus study) did not
demonstrate that any state actor had purposefully discriminated
in McCleskey's own case. Nor, in the Court's estimation, did it
demonstrate that Georgia had adopted or maintained its death
penalty system as a whole "because of" its racially skewed impact.
The Court therefore concluded that McCleskey had not proven a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
What does "intent" mean in the equal protection context? Some
have equated discriminatory intent with "malice," or a desire to
harm a subjugated group.27 Others have equated intent with con-
22 442 US 256 (1979).
23 Id at 279. See also City of Memphis v Greene, 451 US 100, reh'g den 452 US 955 (1981)
(rejecting claim that a city's decision to close a street within a white neighborhood used
primarily by black motorists constituted "intentional" discrimination).
24 McCleskey has been variously described as the "most troubling," and "most controversial
and, to some, notorious" of the cases applying the intent rule. See Theodore Eisenberg
and Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work? 76
Cornell L Rev 1151, 1159-60 (1991) ("most troubling"); Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent
in Equal Protection, 41 Stan L Rev 1105, 1142 (1989) ("most controversial").
25McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 292-93, 298-99 (1987).
26 Id at 298.
27 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan L Rev 1111, 1134-35 (1997); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
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scious awareness or deliberate behavior. 28 However, these under-
standings are inadequate and inconsistent with the Court's own
case law.29 The notion that intent equates to malice is peculiar.3"
Imagine a state official who refused to hire racial minorities into
government jobs not because he disliked minorities, but only be-
cause he wished to benefit his own ethnic group by hiring them.
Surely such actions would constitute "intentional" discrimination.
Consider also Palmore v Sidoti, where the Court unanimously held
that a state's denial of child custody to a divorced mother because
she was part of a interracial couple violated the Equal Protection
Clause, even though the denial of custody was motivated by "the
best interests of the child" in that the state's purpose was to protect
the child from the discrimination that such couples are likely to
face.31 Palmore seems to establish quite clearly that intent may exist
without malice.
The reasons why "intent" cannot be equated with conscious
awareness are more complex, but ultimately also powerful. Feeney
establishes that conscious awareness of harm, standing alone, does
not constitute discrimination, and that intent is not the same thing
as consciousness. But Feeney does not exclude the possibility that
conscious awareness may be a necessary element of intent. In con-
sidering this issue it is necessary to first ask what else "intent"
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discimination in Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 Stan L Rev 1161, 1177 (1995); Kennedy, 101 Harv L Rev at 1404-05 (cited
in note 5).
" See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 Mich L Rev 953, 980 (1993); see generally Mi-
chael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86
Georgetown L J 279, 288-89 and n 5 (1997).
29 Id at 288-89.
o Recent cases establish quite clearly that proof of malice is not required to challenge
government action that is explicitly race-based. The Court in recent years has invalidated
on equal protection grounds many state and federal affirmative action programs designed
to benefit racial minorities. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Pena, 515 US 200 (1995);
City of Richmond v JA Croson Co., 488 US 469 (1989); see also Hopwood v Texas, 78 F3d
932 (5th Cir 1996), cert den 116 S Ct 2580 (1996). No one would seriously suggest that
such programs are motivated by malice against their white "victims." Nonetheless, such
programs are regularly struck down. In another line of recent cases, involving racially based
resdistricting, the Court has invalidated "majority-minority" legislative districts drawn in
unusual shapes for the apparent purpose of enhancing the voting power of racial minorities.
See, e.g., Bush v Vera, 116 S Ct 1941 (1996); Miller vjohnson, 515 US 900 (1995); Shaw
v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993). Once again, the creation of such districts cannot seriously be
ascribed to "malice" toward whites, but they have been nonetheless held to "intentionally
discriminate."
3' 466 US 429 (1984).
[1998
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could possibly be. If neither malice nor conscious awareness is in-
tent, then what is it? In a recent paper, Michael Selmi points out
that when one examines the Court's "intent" decisions closely, es-
pecially Feeney and McCleskey, what the Court really seems to mean
by intent is causation-whether, in fact, particular government
conduct was caused by the race of the adversely affected parties.
Such an explanation is consistent with the "because of" language
of Feeney and McCleskey, and with the reasoning and results in the
vast majority of the Court's decisions, in a way that no other the-
ory can match.32 The term "causation," as used here, is essentially
equivalent to the concept of "but for" causation as used in tort
and criminal law, rather than "legal" or "proximate" cause. There
are some practical differences between causation in this context
and criminal or tort causation, particularly in terms of ease of
proof, but the fundamental inquiry is the same. In the tort and
criminal contexts, but-for causation generally turns on whether as
a matter of objective, physical fact a particular outcome resulted
from the particular conduct by an individual. Causation in the
equal protection context requires an examination of the decision-
making process engaged in by a government actor to determine
if race was a determinative input into that process (for this reason,
it is not incongruous to use the term "intent" to describe this anal-
ysis). Note that even the equal protection causation test is not pri-
marily an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of the decision
maker. Instead, it seeks to determine whether the ultimate result
would have been the same if the races of the affected individuals
were different with all other factors left unchanged.33
Assuming that the best reading of the Court's cases is that "in-
tent" in the equal protection context refers to causation, the ques-
tion left open in Feeney remains: whether the intent standard re-
quires that the relevant government actors be conscious that race
32 See Selmi, 86 Georgetown L J at 289-94 (cited in note 28); see also George Ruther-
glen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 Va L Rev 117, 127 (1995); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond
Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimi-
nation Law, 70 Tex L Rev 17, 93 (1991).
3' This understanding of "intent," as essentially an inquiry into causation, is probably
best expressed by David Strauss's proposed "reversing the groups" test: to determine if
intentional discrimination exists, one must ask whether if the race (or gender) of the affected
individuals had been reversed, the same action would have been taken. Selmi, 86 George-
town L J at 291-94 (cited in note 28) (citing David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U Chi L Rev 935, 958 (1989)).
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has affected their decision making. Of course, this issue arises only
if one believes that certain kinds of mental processes can be influ-
enced, even decisively influenced, by factors of which the person is
unaware. In the late twentieth century, however, few people would
seriously deny that some mental processes occur below the con-
scious level. As Charles Lawrence has demonstrated, overwhelm-
ing psychological evidence supports the proposition that racism,
meaning decision making influenced by racial factors, is one of
those processes that often occurs within the unconscious.34 What,
then, is the constitutional status of governmental action caused by
racial factors-meaning that if race alone had been different, the
state would have acted differently-but where the government
actor was not consciously aware of those racial factors?
The Court has never squarely considered the possibility. There
are, however, strong reasons why the government actor's conscious
mental state should be irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. If
a plaintiff is able to prove that government action was taken because
Of race, to ask the plaintiff to further prove that the state actor was
consciously aware of this fact imposes an almost insurmountable
burden of proof (except in the rare instance where the decision
maker admits the awareness). It is also not clear what policies
would be advanced by such a requirement. 3 Moreover, the argu-
ment in favor of a purely causation-based approach to intent, pow-
erful as it is when applied to individual governmental decision
makers, becomes overwhelming when the government conduct at
issue is the product of collective decision making, as many discrim-
inatory state policies are. In the collective context, the concept of
conscious intent is not merely difficult to prove, it is meaningless.
Groups do not have mental states, and while individual members
of groups might be shown to possess particular mental states, there
is no evident reason to attribute the motive of any particular indi-
4 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317, 328-44 (1987). We concede that it may be controversial to use
the word "racism" to describe such unconscious racially influenced behavior. Terminology,
however, is beside the point-the issue is whether such behavior is proscribed by the Equal
Protection Clause.
1s See Selmi, 86 Georgetown L J at 294 (cited in note 28); Charles R. Lawrence III, 39
Stan L Rev 317 (cited in note 28); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Harv L Rev 1, 14-15 (1976).
[1998
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vidual to the group as a whole. Causation, on the other hand, re-
mains a coherent (though complex) inquiry in the group context.
As a consequence, when assessing the constitutionality of collective
decision making, a causation analysis is not only a possible mode of
inquiry in defining intent, it is the most coherent mode of inquiry.
The above discussion of the meaning of the intent standard and
its proper application in the context of unconscious racism and
collective decision making is crucial to a proper assessment of
McCleskey. The racial disparities observed in modern death penalty
schemes, especially the differing treatment of victims of different
races, are almost certainly not a product of racial animus, and in-
deed probably not even of conscious racism.36 Instead, the results
are probably best explained as a result of a selective indifference
on the part of prosecutors (and jurors) toward the plight of black
victims. In short, decision makers, whether consciously or not, do
not value the lives of black victims at the same level as they value
the lives of white victims, leaving aside for now the question of
which valuation is "correct."3 Race is thus a causal factor with
respect to government decision making in this context, in the sense
that it is a but-for cause, even if it is not the motive for the decision
or even in the conscious awareness of the various actors. That
should be sufficient to establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
One further matter merits discussion. It is possible that prosecu-
tors (many of whom are elected) are choosing not to punish mur-
derers of blacks in the same way as murderers of whites not be-
cause the prosecutors value the lives of black victims less, but
because they perceive that the public does so. These prosecutors
may wish to maximize their political gain from death penalty pros-
ecutions, or to maximize their probability of obtaining a verdict
of death from juries who are infected by the same biases as the
general public.3" The Court's decision in Palmore v Sidoti makes
36 See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 Harv L Rev 1388, 1419-21 (1988); Carter, 97 Yale L J at 420, 444 (cited in
note 17).
" See Part II.B. for a discussion of the "baseline" problem raised by such discriminatory
evaluation.
38 Compare Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 Stan L Rev 27, 106-09 (1984).
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clear, however, that a decision by a governmental actor effectuat-
ing or catering to private discrimination itself violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 39
Finally, we reach that most perplexing facet of McCleskey-the
relationship between the "intent" requirement and the use of sta-
tistical evidence. At bottom, McCleskey rests on the conclusion that
even the sophisticated, multivariate regression analysis of the Bal-
dus study is inadequate as a matter of law in this context to "prove"
intentional discrimination in a particular case. McCleskey did not
hold that statistical evidence is always insufficient to prove intent.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged that in jury selection and employ-
ment discrimination cases, statistical evidence is regularly accepted
as evidence of intent. But the Court distinguished the death pen-
alty context primarily on the ground that the presence of substan-
tial discretion in capital sentencing made reliance on statistical evi-
dence inappropriate.4°
The Court's reasoning reflects a profound misunderstanding of
the nature of statistical evidence and of discretion. The existence
of discretion does not mean that decisions are random or that they
are not produced by guiding factors. If that is what discretion
meant, then the death penalty would be generally unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment.4 Discretion means that a decision
is properly influenced by numerous, often incommensurate factors.
Without a doubt, the presence of substantial discretion often
makes it difficult to determine with precision the true causes of
a decision. But isolating such causes is exactly what multivariate
regression analysis does. The purpose of such analysis is to ferret
out causation when direct evidence is lacking. Multivariate regres-
sion analysis seeks to determine the causal influence of a variety
of factors, all of which are understood to have an impact on a final
result. It achieves this by holding other variables constant, thus
39 466 US 429, 433 (1984) ("[t]he Constitution cannot control [private] prejudices but
neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. 'Public officials sworn to uphold the
Constitution may not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of
private racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held.' " (quoting
Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217, 260-261 (1971) (White, J, dissenting))); see note 31 and
accompanying text.
' See McCleskey, 481 US at 292-97.
41 See Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972).
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isolating the effects of the suspected variable. Of course, statistical
evidence can never provide direct evidence of intent (or causation)
in any particular case. And there is always the danger that any
particular statistical analysis has left out an important causal vari-
able, thereby undermining the validity of its results. No scientific
study is any better than the methodology that produces it. But a
careful analysis based on a well-formulated model can provide valid
circumstantial evidence of causation.42
The statistical evidence of race-of-the-victim discrimination in
the capital sentencing system is more than sufficient to establish
causation. The Baldus study controlled for every relevant variable
other than race, which is why the study is regarded as an exemplary
piece of social science research.43 Furthermore, as noted above, the
results of the Baldus study have been replicated in a number of
other sophisticated studies. Such consistency of results, across dif-
ferent data sets, different models, and different time periods, is
more than sufficient to establish that race is a causal factor in the
capital sentencing system.
Why, then, did the Court reject McCleskey's statistical chal-
lenge to the Georgia death penalty system? Though the majority
opinion is somewhat opaque on this point,44 it seems to suggest
that statistical evidence, no matter how powerful, cannot prove
causation in a particular case; and the primary basis for this conclu-
sion appears to have been concerns about the practical conse-
quences of permitting statistical evidence to make out even a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination:
[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey
must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with dis-
42 For an example of the relationship between causation and statistical evidence, consider
the example of tobacco and lung cancer. Until recently, medical science had been unable
to determine the direct chain of events between smoking cigarettes and developing lung
cancer. See David Stout, Direct Link Found Between Smoking and Lung Cancer, New York
Times Al (Oct. 18, 1996) (reporting recent scientific study claiming to find first direct,
causal link between smoking and lung cancer). In other words, scientists were unable to
find direct evidence of causation. Nonetheless, there was overwhelming statistical evidence
of the link between smoking and lung cancer, see The Health Consequences of Smoking: A
Report of the Surgeon General, 1982 6-42 (1982), and few respectable scientists (other than
those working for tobacco companies) doubted that a causal link existed between the two.
43 See note 5.
44 The Court stated, "The unique nature of the decisions at issue in this case also counsels
against adopting [an inference of discrimination] from the disparities indicated by the Baldus
study." 481 US at 297. The Court declined to specify what that "unique nature" was.
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criminatory purpose. He offers no evidence specific to his own
case that would support an inference that racial considerations
played a part in his sentence. Instead, he relies solely on the
Baldus study. McCleskey argues that the Baldus study compels
an inference that his sentence rests on purposeful discrimina-
tion. McCleskey's claim that these statistics are sufficient proof
of discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular
case, would extend to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where
the victim was white and the defendant is black.4"
There are several responses to the last sentence in this passage.
First, the Court is simply wrong when it asserts that acceptance
of the Baldus study would invalidate all capital sentences in Geor-
gia "where the victim was white and the defendant is black." The
Baldus study found that the race of the defendant was not an im-
portant variable in capital sentencing decisions. Not all black de-
fendants convicted of killing white victims would be entitled to
relief, and it is conceivable that some white defendants convict-
ing of killing white victims might be entitled to relief. Second,
McCleskey's claim works only in cases involving comparable levels
of heinousness. The Baldus study found little divergence between
white-victim cases and black-victim cases where the killings were
especially aggravated or relatively unaggravated. Third, acceptance
of the Baldus study does not require invalidation of all suspect sen-
tences, it only creates a prima facie case against them. Prosecutors
would remain able to rebut any inference of discrimination raised
by statistical evidence, and so to save death sentences from invali-
dation. Finally, it is quite possible that under the Supreme Court's
holding in Teague v Lane,46 which postdated McCleskey by two
years, a decision recognizing claims such as McCleskey's would
not be applied retroactively on federal habeas review, so that only
death sentences still on direct review, and of course future trials,
would be affected.
The Court's response to its concerns over the effects of ruling
for McCleskey was to paper over the issue of the requisite quan-
tum of proof for McCleskey's equal protection claim. The Baldus
study did not prove to a moral certainty or beyond a reasonable
4'481 US at 292-93 (footnote omitted).
- 489 US 288 (1989).
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doubt that race caused McCleskey's capital sentence. But constitu-
tional claims ordinarily need be proven only by a preponderance
of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to McCleskey, which the Court was required to do, a reasonable
finder of fact certainly could have concluded that racial factors
more likely than not caused the prosecutor to seek the death pen-
alty against McCleskey. The Court, however, apparently held
McCleskey to a higher standard of proof than preponderance of
the evidence. "Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice
process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we
would infer that the discretion has been abused," Justice Powell
wrote.47 When the Court says that it will disturb prosecutorial de-
cisions about the death penalty only upon "exceptionally clear-
proof" of discrimination, it is saying that prosecutors are free to
discriminate against victims on the basis of their race as long as
they do not advertise it by admitting to the discrimination or ut-
tering racial epithets in public. This is a stunning message. More-
over, the Court has not accorded prosecutors that level of discre-
tion in exercising peremptory challenges in criminal cases. A Batson
claimant must prove intent to discriminate, but the Court has
never suggested that such intent must be proved by "exceptionally
clear" evidence.
Ultimately, McCleskey appears to rest on a misunderstanding of
the statistical evidence provided by the Baldus study. The Court
in McCleskey equated the regression analysis in that case with the
simple racial correlations at issue in Davis, Arlington Heights, and
Feeney.48 But there is a critical difference between the statistical
evidence in McCleskey and the evidence in the earlier cases. By rely-
ing only on simple correlations to assert an equal protection chal-
lenge, none of the plaintiffs in the earlier cases had proved that
race or gender was a cause of the challenged conduct, rather than
some other causal factor which correlated with race or gender. In
McCleskey, on the other hand, the Baldus study established that in
a substantial number of capital cases, the same result would not
have occurred but for the race of the victim, and that there was
therefore a substantial probability that McCleskey's sentence
47481 US at 297.
4 See notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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would not have been the same had the race of his victim been
different.49
An account of the Court's misadventures with statistical evi-
dence, however, tells only one story about McCleskey. In fact, there
was more at work in McCleskey than a dispute over statistics, or a
technical error by the Court. As almost every commentator has
noted, McCleskey was clearly influenced by the Court's concerns
about the practical and societal consequences of granting McCleskey
relief."0 In particular, the Court was concerned that granting relief
might undermine the criminal justice system by allowing great
numbers of defendants to challenge their sentences."' Moreover,
one of the most intractible issues in McCleskey involved the precise
nature of the equal protection claim. Relatively early in its opinion,
the Court stated that McCleskey was not seeking to litigate the
rights of victims who may have been discriminated against by the
Georgia capital sentencing system. 2 As noted above, however,
victim-based discrimination is the only form of discrimination in
capital sentencing for which statistical analyses have presented
strong evidence. This raises the question of the precise nature of
the claim that McCleskey sought to raise and that the Court re-
jected. As Randall Kennedy notes, it became clear during oral ar-
gument in McCleskey that the justices were quite concerned about
the justiciability issues raised by the interaction between a victim-
based claim and a defendant claimant. But as he also notes, the
" There is a telling passage in Justice Powell's majority opinion. Toward the end of the
discussion rejecting McCleskey's statistical evidence, the Court states that there is no reason
to infer discriminatory intent from the Baldus study "because a legitimate and unchallenged
explanation for the decision [to sentence McCleskey to death] is apparent from the record:
McCleskey committed an act for which the United States Constitution and Georgia laws
permit imposition of the death penalty." 481 US at 297. This statement suggests that the
Court did not fully understand McCleskey's argument. The Baldus study proved that a
large number of people in McCleskey's situation would not have been sentenced to death
if their victims had been black. Every single one of these people had "committed an act
for which the United States Constitution and Georgia laws permit imposition of the death
penalty." That McCleskey was eligible for the death penalty did nothing to distinguish him
from them, and therefore did nothing to negate the substantial probability that he would
not have gotten the death penalty had his victim been black. To support its conclusion,
the Court had to distinguish McCleskey from other "midrange" killers of black victims
who did not receive the death penalty. It did not.
1o See, e.g., Ortiz, 41 Stan L Rev at 1142-49 (cited in note 24); Kennedy, 101 Harv L
Rev at 1413-15 (cited in note 5); Carter, 97 Yale Q at 440-41 (cited in note 17); Selmi,
86 Georgetown L J at 320-23, 347 (cited in note 28).
" McCleskey, 481 US at 314-19.
52 Id at 292 n 8.
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opinions in the case failed to examine this issue.53 In the remainder
of this article, we will explicate the complex relationships between
race-of-victim discrimination and modern justiciability law, with a
particular focus on the remedial alternatives open to legislatures
and courts in responding to unconstitutional prosecutorial discrim-
ination against black murder victims.
III. ASCERTAINING THE NATURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
VIOLATIONS
In the previous section, we have tried to demonstrate that
a prosecutor violates the Equal Protection Clause when he even
unconsciously elects not to seek the death penalty because the vic-
tim is black or elects to seek the death penalty because the victim
is white. But there remains the rather puzzling matter of crafting
an appropriate remedy.
A. OVERVALUATION AND UNDERVALUATION OF VICTIMS' LIVES
The soundest approach to analyzing possible remedies for pros-
ecutorial discrimination against victims on the basis of race is to
divide such discrimination into two categories: (1) cases where the
prosecutor seeks the death penalty because the prosecutor "over-
values" a white victim because of race, and (2) cases where the
prosecutor chooses not to seek the death penalty because the pros-
ecutor "undervalues" a black victim because of race. The following
matrix illustrates the relationship between the nature of the consti-
tutional violation and the party structure of the litigation.
Overvaluation Undervaluation
Defendants Cell 1 Cell 3
Victims' Families Cell 2 Cell 4
This approach links the remedy with the nature of the equal pro-
tection violation. In theory, every equal protection case poses the
problem of whether to "level up" or "level down. '54 If Group A
B Kennedy, 101 Harv L Rev at 1392 n 15 (cited in note 5).
14 See Welsh v United States, 398 US 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J, concurring in result).
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is being treated worse than Group B for no constitutionally per-
missible reason, the court must decide whether to raise Group A
to Group B's level or whether to lower Group B to Group A's
level. (If the subject matter is amenable, the court might have the
groups meet halfway.) But without some normative baseline, the
choice between these remedies is arbitrary. As we explain later, in
choosing a remedy, the Equal Protection Clause requires the court
to ascertain how the governmental actor would have behaved had
it not used the impermissible classification."5 On rare occasions,
the governmental actor has already expressed its view of whether
to level up or down if a court should find that the act violates
equal protection. The court must respect this intent. Usually, how-
ever, the governmental actor has not considered what should hap-
pen if its act is held unconstitutional. In that case, the court must
do its best to ascertain what the actor would have done had it not
taken any impermissible consideration into account.
In the preceding matrix, the horizontal axis depicts the dichot-
omy between equal protection violations consisting of the over-
valuation of white victims' lives versus those consisting of the un-
dervaluation of black victims' lives. The vertical axis represents the
two groups of litigants who might seek to challenge discrimination
on the basis of the victim's race-first, defendants facing capital
punishment for killing white victims; second, the families of black
murder victims. In this matrix, we assume that all defendants facing
capital punishment who challenge discrimination in favor of white
victims seek to have their sentences commuted to life imprison-
ment-that is, to be treated in the same way as defendants who
murder black victims. Presumably, they are uninterested in win-
ning damages.
We conclude that the viable remedies for prosecutorial race dis-
crimination against murder victims lie in Cells 1 and 4. A capital
defendant should be able to seek commutation of his death sen-
" See notes 106-10 and accompanying text; Heckler v Mathews, 465 US 728, 738-39 and
n 5 (1984) (suggesting that if the legislature has indicated a preference regarding the proper
remedy, courts should generally abide by that preference). See also People v Liberta, 474
NE 2d 567 (NY 1984), in which the New York Court of Appeals held that unmarried men
were denied equal protection because, unlike married men, they could not rape their sig-
nificant others with impunity. The court had two choices: extend rape law to married men
or abolish it for unmarried men. The court stated that it was required to "discern what
course the Legislature would have chosen to follow if it had foreseen our conclusions ......
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tence when he proves that the prosecutor's overvaluation of his
white victim's life constituted a "but-for" cause of the death sen-
tence. The relatives of a black victim should be able to recover
damages if they prove that the prosecutor's undervaluation of the
victim's life was a "but-for" cause of the decision not to seek the
death penalty. In the balance of this article we explain further our
analytic framework and conclusions.
B. PROVING OVERVALUATION AND UNDERVALUATION
How can one tell whether a prosecutor has overvalued, under-
valued, or properly valued a victim's life? How can one possibly
know what a "correct" nonracial valuation would be in any partic-
ular case? We do not claim that there is an objectively correct
valuation. Rather, the correct valuation is whatever the prosecutor
would have decided had he been blind to the victim's race. If a
prosecutor would have pursued the death penalty without knowing
the victim's race, but declined to seek the death penalty knowing
the victim was black, then he has undervalued the victim's life
on the basis of race. If the prosecutor would have forgone the
death penalty not knowing the victim's race, but sought it knowing
the victim was white, then he has overvalued the victim's life. The
"'correct" valuation is a purely subjective matter.
How would a claimant prove an equal protection violation on
either an overvaluation or undervaluation theory? The first step
would be to ascertain a baseline. To do this, we must know two
things: (1) the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and
(2) the rate at which prosecutors seek the death penalty in cases
with similar factors. We will refer to the first consideration as the
"aggravation level" and the second as the "seek rate." The aggra-
vation level for a particular case is determined by the application
of an "aggravation index." The index consists of a list of factors
correlating strongly with prosecutorial decisions to seek the death
penalty. Each factor is assigned a value based on the strength of
its correlation with decisions to seek capital punishment. The cu-
mulation of these values produces an "aggravation level" for the
case.
For illustrative purposes, we have reprinted a table from the Bal-
dus study that could be used as a model aggravation index (see
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Table 1).56 Baldus explains that the "key measures of the impact
of a given variable are the logistic-regression coefficient . . . and
the odds multiplier, which is the antilog of the logistic-regression
coefficient.""7 The higher the odds multiplier or logistic-regres-
sion coefficient, the greater the influence on the capital sentencing
decision. The variables present in any particular case are combined
to produce an overall aggravation level. Next, cases are grouped
according to aggravation levels and it is determined how often
prosecutors seek the death penalty for that particular aggravation
range. We have also reprinted a graph from the Baldus study
showing the relationship between aggravation levels and the corre-
sponding death sentencing rates (see Fig. 1). Because our proposal
covers prosecutorial discrimination only, we would substitute seek
rates for actual death sentencing rates.
Consider the following hypothetical. The prosecutor seeks the
death penalty in a case in which the defendant murdered a white
person under factual circumstances that place the case at 0.48 on
the aggravation index. The seek rate for cases in this range is 26
percent. This means that in 74 percent of aggravation-comparable
cases cutting across race, prosecutors do not seek the death pen-
alty.
We already have enough information to question the prosecu-
tor's decision. The aggravation index is drawn from the Baldus
study's thirty-nine-variable model, 8 which already has taken into
account the most significant reasons why a prosecutor would or
"The Baldus study covered only Georgia. Because of peculiarities in the capital sentenc-
ing systems of individual states, challenges to capital sentencing would have to be based
on statistical studies specific to those states. Several such studies have already been con-
ducted. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet and Glenn L Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die:
Race and the Death Penalty in Florida, 43 Fla L Rev 1 (1991); Thomas J. Keil and Gennaro
F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: 1976-1991: A Study of Racial
Bias as a Factor in Capital Sentencing, http://dpa.state.ky.us/-rwheeler/archives/race/vito.txt
(1995); but see Stephen P. Klein and John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim
Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32 JurimetJ 33 (1991) (finding no statistically
significant racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty in California).
" Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, supra, Equal Justice and the Death Penalty at 71 n 34
(cited in note 7).
" The model contains thirty-nine nonracial variables plus the race of the defendant and
the race of the victim. The race of the defendant was found not to exert much influence
on the capital sentencing process; the race of the victim was found to exert great influence.
Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, Equal Justice and the Death Penalty at 319 (Table 52) (cited
in note 7).
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TABLE 1
LOGISTIC-REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, ESTIMATED FOR SELECTED AGGRAVATING AND
MITIGATING FACTORS AND THE RACE OF VICTIM AND DEFENDANT IN AN ANALYSIS OF
DEATH-SENTENCING OUTCOMES, CSS
Variable Label and Name
1. Defendant was not the triggerman (NOKILL)
2. Defendant admitted guilt and no defense as-
serted (DEFADMIT)
3. Defendant had a history of drug or alcohol
abuse (DRGHIS)
4. Defendant was under 17 years of age (SMYOUTH)
5. Jealousy motive JEALOUS)
6. Family, lover, liquor, or barroom quarrel
(BLVICMOD)
7. Defendant was retired, student, juvenile, house-
wife (MITDEFN)
8. Hate motive (HATE)
9. Pecuniary gain motive for self/other (LDFB4)*
10. Defendant was black (BLACKD)
11. Number of prior defendant felony prison terms
(PRISONX)
12. Defendant caused death risk in public place to 2
or more people (LDFB3)
13. One or more coperpetrators involved (COPERP)
14. Defendant was a female (FEMDEF)
15. One or more convictions for a violent personal
crime, burglary, or arson (VPCARBR)
16. Nonproperty-related contemporaneous crime
(NONPROPC)
17. Killing to avoid, stop arrest of self, other
(LDFB10)
18. Victim was a police or corrections officer on
duty (LDFB8)
19. Defendant primary mover in planning homicide
or contemporaneous offense (DLEADER)
20. Rape/armed robbery/kidnapping plus silence wit-
ness, execution, or victim pleaded for life
(LDFB7D)
21. Coperpetrator received a lesser sentence
(CPLESSEN)
22. Multiple shots (MULSH)
23. Victim was drowned (DROWN)
24. Victim was a stranger (STRANGER)
25. Victim bedridden/handicapped (VBED)
26. Kidnapping involved (KIDNAP)
Death-
Odds
Multiplier
.06
.28
Adjusted Logistic
Regression Coefficient
(with Level of
Statistical Significance)
-2.75 (.0001)
-1.27 (.12)
.36 -1.01 (.007)
-. 88 (.23)
-. 74 (.53)
-. 61 (.15)
-. 61 (.64)
-. 34 (.69)
-. 22 (.70)
-. 06 (.88)
.08 (.67)
.14 (.74)
.24 (.56)
.28 (.70)
.30 (.53)
.35 (.64)
.41 (.32)
.52 (.58)
.55 (.33)
.60 (.16)
.78 (.09)
.79 (.04)
.96 (.24)
1.03 (.01)
1.04 (.33)
1.06 (.17)
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Adjusted Logistic
Death- Regression Coefficient
Odds (with Level of
Variable Label and Name Multiplier Statistical Significance)
27. Victim weak or frail (vwEAK) 3.1 1.13 (.19)
28. Defendant had a prior record for murder, 4.1 1.40 (.009)
armed robbery, rape, or kidnapping with bodily
injury (LDFBI)
29. Armed robbery involved (ARMROB) 4.2 1.43 (.02)
30. One or more white victims (wHvlcIc) 4.3 1.45 (.003)
31. Multiple stabbing (MULTSTAB) 4.7 1.54 (.002)
32. Victim was 12 or younger (VICCHILD) 4.8 1.56 (.03)
33. Number of defendant prior murder convictions 5.2 1.66 (.27)
(MURPRIOR)
34. Murder for hire (LDFB6) 5.9 1.77 (.08)
35. Defendant was a prisoner or escapee (LDFB9) 7.7 2.04 (.002)
36. Defendant killed two or more people (Twovlc) 7.9 2.07 (.005)
37. Mental torture involved (MENTORT) 9.7 2.27 (.009)
38. Rape involved (RAPE) 12.8 2.55 (.001)
39. Defendant's motive was to collect insurance 20.1 3.01 (.01)
(INSMOT)
40. Victim was tortured physically (TORTURE) 27.4 3.31 (.003)
41. Motive was to avenge role by judicial officer,
D.A., lawyer (AVENGE) 28.9 3.36 (.25)
Constant -6.15 (.0001)
SOuRCE.-From David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, and Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Equal Justice and the Death Penalty:
A Legal and Empirical Analysis 321 (fig. 32) (1990).
NOT.-The table reports the odds multiplier and coefficients for the race-of-defendant and the race-of-victim vari-
ables in the thirty-nine-variable core model. The outcome variable was DSErALL, coded: I = Death Sentence, 0 =
Other Sentence.
* The negative sign of the coefficient for LDa4 (pecuniary gain motive) is perverse. We attribute the sign of LDFB4
to its correlation with the variable for armed robbery (AtMROa).
would not seek the death penalty. Knowing the aggravation level,
but without knowing the race of his victim, we would predict that
the prosecutor would not seek the death penalty. When it is re-
vealed that the prosecutor sought capital punishment, and that the
victim was white, we have good reason to suspect that race played
a proximate role in the decision.
Why do our suspicions gravitate toward race? We look first to
race because the Baldus study strongly indicates that the race of
the victim exerts a high degree of influence on the capital sentenc-
ing process in the midrange-aggravation cases. When the case in-
volves one or more white victims, the odds of receiving a death
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95% Confidence
Limits for Mean
Death-Sentencing
Rate
0.4 0.6
Level of Aggravation
0.8 1 1.2
FIG. 1.-Black defendant model, Georgia Charging and Sentencing Study, 1973-1979.
(From David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, and Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Equal Justice and
the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis 321 (Fig. 32) (1990).)
sentence are multiplied on average by a magnitude of 4.3.59 As
Justice Brennan pointed out in his McCleskey dissent, this puts the
influence of the victim's race virtually on a par with the influence
of multiple stabbing, a serious prior criminal record, or involve-
ment in an armed robbery.6" Because the race of the victim is so
influential, and because it is not taken into account in the aggrava-
tion index, while all other, properly relevant factors are, our suspi-
cions naturally turn to that factor.
This reason for suspecting race can be illustrated in another way.
Consider the differential between seek rates for cases involving
white and black victims. The average seek rate for white-victim
" This odds multiplier cuts across all aggravation levels. The odds multiplier at
McCleskey's specific aggravation level is closer to 2.2 (37 percent divided by 17 percent).
See note 62 and accompanying text.
o 481 US at 326 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
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cases in the 0.4 to 0.6 range is 37 percent. The average seek rate
for black-victim cases in the same range is 17 percent.61 Prosecu-
tors are more than twice as likely to seek the death penalty in a
white-victim case in this range as in a black-victim case, even after
controlling for the aggravation of the offense. Something has to
explain a discrepancy that large, and race is the leading candidate.
At this point it is critical to emphasize what we have not said.
We have not claimed that the statistics prove race discrimination
in this particular case. Rather, we claim that the statistics create a
strong suspicion of race discrimination-specifically, an overvalu-
ation of the white victim's life.62 This statistical showing should
make out a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause.
Because the defendant has shown that prosecutors in most aggra-
vation-comparable cases do not seek the death penalty, he has
shown that, more likely than not, race discrimination "caused" the
decision to seek the death penalty. The burden should now shift
to the prosecutor to offer a legitimate, persuasive nonracial ratio-
nale for seeking the death penalty.63 This burden-shifting scheme
is virtually identical to what the Court has adopted in jury discrim-
ination challenges under Batson v Kentucky64 and in disparate treat-
ment cases under Tide VII. 65
Once the judge has decided that the claimant has established a
prima facie case, the prosecutor may discharge his burden by giv-
6' Recall that we have fictitiously substituted seek rate for death-sentencing rate in the
Baldus graph.
62 Similarly, to prove undervaluation of a black victim's life a claimant must show that
in similar-aggravation cases, most prosecutors would seek the death penalty if the victim
were white.
6' Before considering how the prosecutor might rebut such a prima facie case, we pause
to consider how large a differential must exist between seek rates for murderers of whites
and murderers of blacks. In our hypothetical case, the difference was dramatic-more than
2 to 1. In such circumstances, the claimant has clearly made out a prima facie case. Suppose,
however, that the differential was much smaller. Suppose it was 19 percent to 17 percent.
Has the claimant still made out a prima facie case? The answer depends on two factors.
One is the size of the relevant statistical universe; the other is the quality of the research
methodology. If the number of death-eligible defendants in the jurisdiction is extremely
large, and if the research methodology is impeccable, a difference of 19 percent to 17
percent could establish a prima facie case. The issue is no different than in other cases
involving statistical proof.
- 476 US 79 (1986). See also Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765 (1995) (in order to rebut prima
facie case, prosecutor need not articulate plausible nonracial explanation for using strike,
but only facially nonracial explanation).
61 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Covnmunity
Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248 (1981).
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ing any number of explanations. Perhaps the prosecutor had a
close relative who died under similar circumstances. Perhaps the
defendant was a member of a particularly vicious gang. Perhaps
the prosecutor needed to seek the death penalty in this case to get
re-elected. All of these rationales go beyond the factors examined
in the Baldus study and might satisfactorily explain why the prose-
cutor sought the death penalty in this particular case, without re-
gard to race.
In many (if not most) cases, however, the prosecutor will be
unwilling or unable to point to a specific factor outside the Baldus
study. A prosecutor may simply say that he sought the death pen-
alty because the defendant had committed a heinous murder.
Other prosecutors might not find it heinous, but that is not the
issue. The prosecutor in this case found it heinous, and that is not
a racial reason for seeking the death penalty.
If it is so easy for a prosecutor to articulate a nonracial rationale
for seeking the death penalty, then what good is it to afford the
claimant a cause of action? The answer is that the prosecutor's
proffer must be credible. The judge must be persuaded that the
prosecutor has not simply conjured up an after-the-fact rational-
ization for the decision. The multivariate analysis may not prove
what this particular prosecutor thinks about the heinousness of the
facts of this particular case, but it does tell us what most prosecu-
tors think about it. And, unless there is a special reason to think
that this prosecutor regards heinousness quite differently than
other prosecutors, the judge is entitled to find that the proffered
rationale lacks credibility.
Moreover, once the prosecutor has articulated a nonracial ratio-
nale for seeking (or forgoing) the death penalty, the claimant now
has the opportunity to show that the proffered rationale is a pretext
for discrimination. Notice that in this context, a "pretext" may be
one that the prosecutor has offered in good faith, unaware of his
own unconscious racism. The claimant's burden of demonstrating
pretext now "merges" with his or her ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the trier of fact that, more likely than not, the prosecutor dis-
criminated on the basis of race.66 The claimant is entitled to dis-
covery of the prosecutor's prior record in cases where the facts
would have supported the death penalty. The claimant may intro-
66 Compare Texas Department of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248 (1981).
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duce evidence that the prosecutor has a pattern and practice of
seeking the death penalty in cases where the victim is white, but
not where the victim is black.67 Even if a particular prosecutor has
no record at all in capital cases, the judge is entitled to find the
prosecutor's proffer noncredible. 68
In the real world, judges may tend to accept prosecutors' stated
rationales. This appears to have happened with Batson.69 But even
if this happens, there is considerable value in requiring prosecutors
to articulate their reasons. As noted earlier, many prosecutorial de-
cisions about capital sentencing appear to be influenced by uncon-
scious racial thinking. The very existence of a capital sentencing
remedy may lead prosecutors to think more carefully about why
they do and do not seek the death penalty in particular cases.
IV. REMEDIES AND JUSTICIABILITY
In this section, we will individually analyze the possibility
of a successful claim, and the remedial possibilities, in each of the
four cells of our proposed "matrix."7
A. OVERVALUATION OF WHITE VICTIMS-DEFENDANT SEEKS
COMMUTATION
In Cell 1, the defendant argues that he was sentenced to death
because his victim was white. He argues that he would not have
been sentenced to death if the prosecutor had valued the victim's
67 Although most prosecutors have not actually sought the death penalty in a large number
of cases, that is not the relevant comparison pool. The relevant pool consists of all cases
in which the defendant was indicted for (or perhaps merely committed) a crime that would
have supported the death penalty. This includes cases where the prosecutor ultimately re-
duced the charges to voluntary manslaughter or decided to settle for life imprisonment on
a murder conviction. This is a much larger pool of cases, and will often stand ready to
contradict a prosecutor's fabricated rationale for seeking the death penalty.
" Unless the prosecutor has utterly failed to articulate a nonracial rationale, the ultimate
burden of persuasion always rests on the claimant. Cf. St. Maly's Honor Center v Hicks, 509
US 502 (1993) (claimant retained burden of persuasion even where trial judge found defen-
dant's proffer of legitimate reasons implausible). We do not necessarily endorse Hicks. We
simply think there is no reason to treat this issue any differently in the capital sentencing
context than in the disparate treatment context of Title VII.
9 See Susan H. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Color-
blindness, and the Juy, 67 Tulane L Rev 1807, 1830 n 93 (1993) ("overcoming the race-
neutral explanation hurdle has not been that difficult") (citing examples).
71 See text display (page 127).
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life "properly." Assuming the defendant can prove this claim, he
still faces two doctrinal obstacles-first, that he may lack standing;
second, even if the prosecutor did consider the victim's race, this
may not make out a constitutional claim in favor of a defendant.
1. Standing. The Supreme Court has held that the "case or con-
troversy" requirement of Article III imposes three requirements
on any litigant who wishes to assert rights in federal court. First,
the litigant must have suffered particularized "injury-in-fact. ' 7
That is, the litigant must have suffered a tangible harm not com-
mon to all of society.72 Second, the defendant's conduct must have
actually caused the injury.73 Third, the litigant must seek relief that
would redress the injury.7 4 In addition to these constitutional req-
uisites of standing, the Court has held that the litigant generally
must assert his own rights and that he is generally prohibited from
asserting the rights of third parties.75
The defendant who claims that his victim's life has been overval-
ued has no difficulty with the injury-in-fact requirement. His in-
jury is the sentence of death. He also satisfies the causation re-
quirement because the overvaluation of the white victim's life is a
but-for cause of the death sentence. And redressability poses no
problem because the injury (the death sentence) would be fully
redressed by the requested relief (commutation).
The tricky question concerns the prohibition against third-party
standing. If we focus on the inequality between white and black
victims, the rule against third-party standing would apply. The
prosecutor has overvalued the lives of white victims, which violates
the right of black victims to equal protection of the laws. Yet this
violates no right of the defendant. On the other hand, if we focus
on the inequality between the killers of white people and the killers
of black people, the rule against third-party standing does not
7' See Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972).
72 See Frothingham v Mellon, 262 US 447 (1923); Schlesinger v Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 US 208 (1974).
"' See Linda R.S. v Richard D., 410 US 614 (1973); Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490 (1975);
Simon v Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 US 26 (1976).
74 Id.
71 Tileston v Ullman, 318 US 44 (1943) (per curiam); McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420
(1961). The Supreme Court has created one other standing requirement not relevant here.
In cases brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, the litigant must fall within the
"zone of interests" that Congress sought to protect when it enacted the statute in question.
See Assn of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v Camp, 397 US 150 (1970).
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apply. By overvaluing the lives of white victims, the government
treats killers of whites differently than the killers of blacks. This
denies killers of whites equal protection of the laws.
In McCleskey, the Court assumed that the murderer of a white
person has first-party standing to seek commutation of his death
sentence, but its treatment of this issue was relegated to a footnote:
Although McCleskey has standing to claim that he suffers
discrimination because of his own race, the State argues that
he has no standing to contend that he was discriminated against
on the basis of his victim's race. While it is true that we are
reluctant to recognize "standing to assert the rights of third
persons," . . . this does not appear to be the nature of
McCleskey's claim. He does not seek to assert some right of
his victim, or the rights of black murder victims in general.
Rather, McCleskey argues that application of the State's statute
has created a classification that is "an irrational exercise of gov-
ernmental power," . . . because it is not "necessary to the ac-
complishment of some permissible state objective." . . . It
would violate the Equal Protection Clause for a State to base
enforcement of its criminal laws on "an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." . . .
Because McCleskey raises such a claim, he has standing.76
It is worth pausing a moment to digest what the Court has said
here. It distinguishes between two types of equal protection claims:
race-based classifications in particular, and arbitrary classifications
in general. If McCleskey had tried to assert the rights of victims
not to be discriminated against because of their race, he would
confront the Court's prohibition against third-party standing. But
(according to the Court) he made no such claim; he instead
claimed that race discrimination against victims constituted an ar-
bitrary classification in the enforcement of the criminal law. Thus,
McCleskey did not seek to assert the right of victims not to be
discriminated against on the basis of race, but his own right not
to have the criminal law enforced against him on the basis of an
arbitrary classification.77 But could he have raised the rights of
black victims?
76 McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US at 291-92 n 8.
Compare Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Supreme Court Review 1 (litigants
are always permitted to challenge the validity of rules pursuant to which they are
sanctioned).
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If the prohibition against third-party standing were absolute,
one in McCleskey's position clearly would be unable to assert the
rights of victims. But the Court has recognized three exceptions
to the general prohibition. First, if a statute is "substantially over-
broad," defendants whose conduct is unprotected may nonetheless
assert the First Amendment rights of third persons whose pro-
tected conduct would fall within the challenged statute.78 Second,
a claimant may assert the rights of third parties who are unable
to assert their own rights if the claimant would represent the hold-
ers of the rights adequately. For example, in Barrows v Jackson,79
a white vendor sold land to a black family in violation of a racially
restrictive covenant. Other parties to the covenant sued the vendor
for damages. The vendor was permitted to defend on the ground
that enforcement would violate the black family's right to equal
protection. The buyers, not being parties to the covenant, had no
procedural vehicle to assert their rights. Third, the Court on occa-
sion has permitted claimants to assert the rights of those with
whom they have some sort of a relationship. For example, in Craig
v Boren,8" Oklahoma had prohibited sales of 3.2 percent beer to
males under twenty-one and females under eighteen. A beer ven-
dor challenged the law on the ground that it violated the equal
protection rights of males between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one. The Supreme Court recognized the vendor's standing
to assert "those concomitant rights of third parties that would be
'diluted or adversely affected' should [the] constitutional challenge
fail and the statutes remain in force."'" Similarly, in Powers v
Ohio,82 a white criminal defendant challenged a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challeges against black prospective jurors. The Court
found that he had standing to assert the equal protection rights
of these prospective jurors because such discrimination "places the
fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt" and because the rela-
" See Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601 (1973) (overbreadth must be "substantial");
Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940 (creating overbreadth exception).
79 346 US 249 (1953). See also NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449 (1958) (permitting
NAACP to assert its members' rights not to disclose their identities).
80429 US 190 (1976).
11 Id at 194.
82 499 US 400 (1991).
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tionship between the defendant and the jurors "continues through-
out the entire trial."83 Moreover, the prospective jurors had no
ready means to challenge their own exclusion.
Does McCleskey fit any of these exceptions? In part, the answer
depends on whether the families of black victims may sue prosecu-
tors or their employers and vindicate their rights. If so, they need
not rely on condemned murderers to assert the equal protection
rights of black victims. Under present doctrine, however, it is not
clear whether they would succeed in such actions.84 Assuming that
such lawsuits are barred, a person in McCleskey's situation should
have standing to assert the rights of black victims. There can be
no doubt that the condemned "will be a motivated, effective advo-
cate" for the black victim's equal protection rights.8 His life de-
pends on it. And, as in Powers, the overvaluation of the lives of
white victims "places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in
doubt."86 Although the relationship between a condemned killer
of a white person and the family of a black victim may not go any
deeper than their common interest in vindicating equal protection
rights, the Court has several times permitted third-party standing
on the basis of less than profound relationships. In Craig, the beer
vendor presumably had no personal relationship with males be-
tween eighteen and twenty-one, since they could not legally pur-
chase beer. In Powers, the criminal defendant and the excluded ve-
nireperson had never before met, and their common interest was
limited to eradicating race discrimination from that single judicial
proceeding. In Buchanan v Warley, the Court even permitted a liti-
gant to assert the rights of someone with whom he had an antago-
nistic relationship.87 A white seller of land sued the black purchaser
for specific performance. The purchaser defended on the ground
that a racially restrictive ordinance prohibited him from living in
the house. The Supreme Court permitted the white plaintiff to
assert the defendant's right not to be discriminated against on the
basis of race, even though the defendant obviously wished not to
"Id at 411, 413.
"See Part JV.D.
"Powers, 499 US at 414.
,Id at 411.
87 245 US 60 (1917).
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assert the right. McCleskey's basis for third-party standing was at
least as strong as in these cases.
2. The appropriate standard of review. We thus conclude that a
killer of a white, such as McCleskey, who is able to prove that the
prosecutor overvalued the life of his white victim and that if his
victim had been black he would not have received the death pen-
alty, clearly has first-party standing to challenge his capital sen-
tence directly; and probably he also has third-party standing to
raise the rights of black victims who have been discriminated
against by his prosecutor's actions. At this point, the constitutional
standard of review becomes critical. What standard should govern
overvaluation claims brought by defendants-strict scrutiny or
simple rationality? The answer is intertwined with the standing
analysis discussed above. If a defendant such as McCleskey were
granted third-party standing to raise the claims of black victims,
then the standard of review would of course be strict scrutiny-
and the defendant would almost certainly succeed in obtaining
commutation, since the Court has not upheld a racial classification
under strict scrutiny analysis since its infamous Korematsu deci-
sion.8 We have concluded that someone in McCleskey's position
may assert such third-party standing.
Assuming for the sake of analysis that we are wrong in this con-
clusion, and that McCleskey had standing to assert only his own
Fourteenth Amendment right not to be convicted on the basis of
an arbitrary classification (which was the only claim, remember,
that McCleskey himself raised), a difficult question arises. The de-
fendant's death sentence is the product of an arbitrary, racial classi-
fication, but based on his victim's race, not his own. What is the
appropriate constitutional standard of review for such a claim?
The question of what standard of review should apply to an
equal protection claim in which the claimant is disadvantaged be-
cause of a classification based on the race of another person ap-
pears to remain open in the Supreme Court. The issue arose in
the Court's recent decision in Miller v Albright,89 but remained un-
resolved by the Court as a whole. Miller involved an equal protec-
11 Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944) (upholding internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War I1); see also Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81 (1943).
" 118 S Ct 1428 (1998).
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tion challenge brought by the illegitimate, foreign-born daughter
of a U.S. citizen father against a federal statute that made it easier
for the illegitimate, foreign-born children of American women to
claim U.S. citizenship than the foreign-born children of American
men. The plaintiff thus challenged a gender-based statute that dis-
advantaged her because of the gender of a third person, her father,
rather than on her own gender.9" A highly fractured Court rejected
her claim on a variety of grounds, several of which were unrelated
to the issue at hand.91 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, found that the plaintiff
lacked third-party standing to raise her father's equal protection
rights, and that her claim was therefore subject only to rational
basis review.92 If O'Connor's analysis is correct, then an equal pro-
tection challenge by a capital defendant to victim-based discrimi-
nation would also be subject only to rational basis review, absent
third-party standing. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, joined
by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, questioned this aspect of Justice
O'Connor's reasoning,93 but neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice
Breyer cited any pertinent authority for their position, and the
Court as a whole found it unnecessary to resolve the issue.
Lower court authority on this question is sparse. In a few early
cases, courts granted first-party standing to developers suing mu-
nicipalities alleged to have intentionally excluded minority tenants.
The courts in these cases applied heightened scrutiny, suggesting
90 Gender is considered a "semi-suspect" classification under the Equal Protection Clause,
and therefore gender-based classifications are subject to "heightened" scrutiny (though not
quite as heightened as the "strict" scrutiny to which race-based classifications are subject).
See, e.g., United States v Virginia, 518 US 515 (1996).
" In particular, the plurality opinion by Justice Stevens (joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist) granted Miller third-party standing to raise her father's claims, but found that the
statute survived heightened scrutiny, 118 S Ct at 1436-42; while a concurring opinion by
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, reasoned that, for reasons relating to the separation
of powers, the Court lacked authority to grant Miller the relief that she requested, which
was U.S. citizenship, id at 1446-49.
12 Id at 1445 (O'Connor, J, concurring in the judgment). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
provided the fifth and sixth votes for the result.
93 Justice Breyer did not provide any support for his suggestion that Miller's claim should
be subject to heightened scrutiny other than a rather weak analogy to laws that discriminate
based on racial or religious ancestry. The analogy is poor because racial identity is of course
almost by definition transmitted to descendants, and even "religious ancestry" is often trans-
mitted in the sense that children often adopt the faiths of their parents. "Gender ancestry,"
however, is a meaningless concept, since we all have the same "gender ancestry"-one
man, one woman (at least for now).
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that the challenged classification does not have to be based on a
claimant's own race.94 More recently, courts in analogous situations
(primarily challenges brought by employers and general contrac-
tors to government-imposed affirmative action requirements) have
tended to find third-party standing on the part of claimants seeking
to raise the rights of others, and therefore have not considered the
applicable standard of review absent such standing.95 Finally, in a
handful of recent decisions, some courts have suggested, without
explanation, that the identity of the discrimination victim alleged
does affect the standard of review (i.e., the O'Connor position) by
denying third-party standing and then applying deferential review
to equal protection claims; but again, courts have failed to directly
address the difficult standard-of-review question.96
The proper standard of scrutiny for a defendant's challenge to
victim-based discrimination thus remains unresolved. But it is our
view that Justice O'Connor's conclusion in Miller is probably "cor-
rect," in the sense that it is more consistent with the modern
Court's approaches to standing and equal protection issues, and
so better predicts the Court's likely resolution of this question
(leaving aside the question of whether we agree with those ap-
proaches; we do not). In particular, it is clear that in recent years
the Court's understanding of the nature of the equal protection
right has shifted dramatically from a group-based vision to an ex-
tremely individualized approach. That understanding is plainly
more consistent with a regime where strict scrutiny may be in-
voked only by claimants who can show that they were treated dif-
ferently because of their race (or other suspect characteristic). 9 7
" See G.T. Scott v Greenville County, 716 F2d 1409 (4th Cir 1983); Des Vergnes v Seekonk
Water District, 601 F2d 9, 17 (1st Cir 1979); Park View Heights Corp. v City of Black Jack,
467 F2d 1208 (8th Cir 1972).
"5 See, e.g., Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v FCC, 141 F3d 344 (DC Cir 1998) (FCC-
licensed radio station may challenge FCC rule requiring licensees to engage in affirmative
action hiring, by raising the rights of potential applicants); compare Monterey Mechanical
Co. v Wilson, 125 F3d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir 1997) (finding first-party standing for a general
contractor to challenge a requirement of hiring minority subcontractors, but imposing
heightened scrutiny only because the plaintiff was disadvantaged vis-a-vis other general con-
tractors who were woman- or minority-owned).
96 See, e.g., Ablang v Reno, 52 F3d 801, 804-05 and n 4 (9th Cir 1995); Alexander v
Whitman, 114 F3d 1392, 1400-02, 1407-08 (3rd Cir 1997).
9' To explain briefly, if the equal protection right is understood as a group-based right,
then any member of a group may properly raise an equal protection claim and invoke
heightened scrutiny so long as there is injury-in-fact (which of course is not a concern
when a defendant seeks to commute a death sentence). Under this view, any black defendant
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The counterargument would be that any official use of race should
trigger strict scrutiny, even if the claimant herself has not been
discriminated against; but this position does not accord well with
the modern Court's view that the Equal Protection Clause's pri-
mary effect is to protect individuals against being treated differ-
ently because of their race,98 and finds little support in recent case
law. Therefore, it is probably true that under current equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, challenges to classifications based on the
suspect characteristics of others are only subject to rational basis
review.
Of course, concluding that more deferential scrutiny should
apply does not necessarily resolve the question of whether a claim
such as McCleskey's should prevail. Indeed, one can imagine an
argument that any use of a racial classification within the criminal
justice system, no matter how indirect, is so irrational and unac-
ceptable that it should be struck down under any standard of scru-
tiny. But it is quite unlikely that such an argument would prevail
under current standards, and indeed McCleskey might be fairly read
to reject it. The reasons for this are somewhat counterintuitive,
but follow from the nature of a standard of review. The crucial
consequence of subjecting a governmental classification to "strict
scrutiny" is that the classification then becomes presumptively un-
should be able to invoke strict scrutiny to challenge a racially biased capital sentencing
system, even one tainted only by victim discrimination, but white defendants would not.
If, however, the right is an individual one, then it would seem that only a person who is
discriminated against because of his own suspect characteristic may invoke heightened equal
protection scrutiny. At the time McCleskey was decided, the Court had not given much
attention to this dichotomy-which perhaps explains the ambiguity of the Court's standing
discussion in McCleskey. The same ambiguity is demonstated in the Court's decision just
one term earlier in Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), where the Court permitted a
criminal defendant to challenge race-based peremptory challenges employed by prosecutors
against jurors, without any discussion of standing. Later cases in the Batson line, however,
clearly understand the Batson right as belonging to the juror who has been discriminated
against on the basis of her race, which litigants are awarded third-party standing to invoke.
See, e.g., Powers v Ohio, 490 US 400 (1991) (white defendant has third-party standing to
raise equal-protection rights of dismissed black jurors); Campbell v Louisiana, 118 S Ct 1419
(1998) (Batson and Powers apply to grand juror selection). Thus since the McCleskey era, the
Court appears to have moved toward an individualized understanding of the equal protec-
tion right, which in turn would suggest that only rational basis scrutiny would apply to a
defendant's equal-protection challenge to victim-based discrimination in capital sentencing,
unless the defendant were granted third-party standing to raise the rights of black victims.
Note also that a defendant might be able to raise a due process challenge to victim-based
racial discrimination in capital sentencing. See Peters v Kaff, 407 US 493 (1972); Campbell,
118 S Ct at 1424-25.
98 See, e.g., United States v Hays, 515 US 737, 745 (1995).
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constitutional, and the burden falls on the government to establish
an extremely persuasive justification for use of that classification
(a burden which is essentially never met). V/hen a classification is
subject only to rational basis review, however, the presumption is
in favor of constitutionality, and the claimant has the burden of
excluding all possible, legitimate justifications for the classification.
Notice the consequence of this: if, as the above discussion suggests,
the Court will sometimes subject an official racial classification to
only rational basis scrutiny, then the use of race is not always, or
even presumptively, unconstitutional.99 Therefore, in rational basis
cases, simply proving that a racial classification was employed-in
this context, that race was a cause of the decision to seek the death
penalty-is insufficient to make out a valid claim."' Something
more is needed, and the Court's opinion in McCleskey might fairly
be read to require that when a classification is subject only to ratio-
nal basis review, a claimant may be required to introduce particu-
larized evidence of "animus" on the part of the decision maker,
because such a showing would tend to exclude the possibility of
other legitimate justifications for the use of race.0 1 Under this
view, the statistical evidence presented in the Baldus study, while
perhaps sufficient to make out a prima facie case for unconstitu-
tionality under the strict scrutiny standard, is almost surely insuf-
ficient under the rational basis standard because one can easily en-
vision rational reasons why a prosecutor may take into account the
race of a victim in determining whether to seek a death sentence,
other than simple animus toward blacks. These might include
concerns about the prosecutor's ability to prevail before a jury,
combined with problems of limited resources. As noted above,
such justifications cannot, under the Court's jurisprudence, survive
strict scrutiny; but the same might not be true about rational basis
review, with its strong presumption of constitutionality.
9 Oddly, whether or not the classification is presumptively invalid will depend not on
the nature of the classification, but on the identity of the plaintiff, since it is in cases where
the classification turns on the race of a third party, rather than the plaintiff, that rational
basis review is applied. If the third party challenged the classification, strict scrutiny would
apply.
'w This is the strong implication of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Miller, which as ex-
plained above is consistent with the general tenor of the Court's current jurisprudence.
"I1 Further support for this position can be found in the Court's recent decision in Romer
v Evans, 116 S Ct 1620 (1996), where a provision was struck down because it was found
to be motivated by animus toward homosexuals. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose
Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal L Rev 297, 327, 330 (1997).
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B. OVERVALUATION OF WHITE LIVES-BLACK VICTIM'S FAMILY SEEKS
REMEDY
In Cell 2, the family of a black victim seeks the death penalty
on the ground that there exists a difference in the treatment be-
tween killers of whites and blacks attributable to the overvaluation
of white lives.
1 2
Standing is an issue. What injury has the family suffered? The
inclination would be to say they have suffered insufficient punish-
ment of their relative's killer. But the overvaluation scenario posits
that the killers of blacks receive an appropriate level of punish-
ment. It is the killers of whites who are punished too severely.
The family might claim, however, that they have been stigma-
tized by the difference in treatment between killers of whites and
the killer of their relative.'0 3 Such a claim would raise an intriguing
standing problem. In Allen v Wright,114 the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' claim of stigmatic injury resulting from race discrimina-
"I One potential doctrinal barrier to judicial relief for black victims or their families can
be quickly dismissed. Recent case law interprets the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as not requiring states to take positive action to protect their citizens. But
these cases are not inconsistent with the view that the Equal Protection Clause sometimes
might impose just such an obligation. In the leading case, DeShaney v Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 US 189 (1989), the Court held that "nothing in the Due
Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors. The clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power
to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimum levels of safety and security." Id at 195. The
Court also noted in its opinion, however, that its holding was limited to the question of
whether the Due Process Clause imposed a general obligation to protect citizens; and, in
particular, that the decision did not preclude an equal protection challenge to a state's
failure to act, since "[t]he State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services
to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause." Id at 1973.
Moreover, in Briscoe v LaHue, 460 US 325, 338 and n 19 (1983), the Court has specifically
pointed to the historical context of the Equal Protection Clause, recognizing that a state's
failure to equally protect citizens and punish those who commit violence against them vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment.
103 Characterizing the injury as stigma eludes any problem that might otherwise be posed
by Linda R.S. v Richard D., 410 US 614 (1973). There, a woman sued for an injunction
that would have required prosecutors to enforce the criminal child support law against the
father of her illegitimate child. The Supreme Court held that she lacked standing. The
Court ruled that nonenforcement of criminal laws does not constitute cognizable injury-
in-fact. Id at 619. The plaintiff (lid suffer a different sort of injury-failure to receive sup-
port payments. However, it was not clear that the failure to enforce the child support law
caused the husband to withhold support payments. Nor was it clear that enforcement of
the law would actually produce such payments. Once the injury is recast as stigma, however,
these problems disappear. Stigma from race discrimination is judicially cognizable. It is
clearly caused by prosecutors' race-based actions, and it clearly would be redressed by an
injunction against future race-based actions.
1- 468 US 747 (1984).
[1998
HeinOnline  -- 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 180 1998
THE McCLESKEY PUZZLE 181
tion on the ground that the stigma was too abstract. Parents of
black public schoolchildren sued the Internal Revenue Service, al-
leging that it had failed to crack down on tax-exempt private
schools that discriminated against blacks. The Court held that this
claim of stigma failed to satisfy the "injury-in-fact" requirement:
[Plaintiffs do not] have standing to litigate their claims based
on the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination.
There can be no doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury
is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory gov-
ernment action and is sufficient in some circumstances to sup-
port standing. See Heckler v Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-740
(1984). Our cases make clear, however, that such injury accords
a basis for standing only to "those persons who are personally
denied equal treatment" by the challenged discriminatory con-
duct, ibid.
The consequences of recognizing respondents' standing on
the basis of their first claim of injury illustrate why our cases
plainly hold that such injury is not judicially cognizable. If the
abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing would ex-
tend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups
against which the Govenrment was alleged to be discriminating
by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory
school, regardless of the location of the school. . . .A black
person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax exemption
to a racially discriminatory school in Maine. Recognition of
standing in such circumstances would transform the federal
courts into "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." '
In this passage, the Court says two things. First, it confirms that
stigma from race discrimination constitutes injury-in-fact. Second,
it states that the stigma must be peculiar to the claimants. In Cell
2, the stigma meets this requirement. The claimants are the imme-
diate relatives, and the stigma therefore affects them in a way that
it does not affect anyone else. Even if the family's stigma is too
attenuated, it can sue on behalf of the victim, who was "personally
denied equal treatment." Thus, the stigma from differential prose-
cutorial treatment constitutes particularized injury-in-fact.
The next question is whether there exists a sufficient causal rela-
tionship between the stigma and the challenged conduct. One
105 Id at 755-56 (citation omitted).
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might argue that there is no causal relationship because in Cell
2-where we assume overvaluation of white lives-the harm is
caused by the improper decisions to pursue the death penalty
against killers of white victims in other cases, not by the decision
to forgo the death penalty in the case at bar. But such an analysis
is flawed. There is no reason to characterize the "challenged con-
duct" as the decision to forgo the death penalty in the present case
rather than as the improper decisions to seek the death penalty in
other cases. The fact that the plaintiff seeks to have the former
decision reversed is irrelevant to causation. The issue of relief is
not relevant in a standing analysis until the third stage-re-
dressability. The challenged conduct in this case consists of the
improper decisions to seek the death penalty in other cases, and
those decisions clearly "cause" the plaintiffs' stigmatic injury.
The redressability inquiry asks whether the relief sought will
redress the plaintiff's injury-in-fact. In Cell 2, the plaintiffs seek
to have the prosecutor pursue the death penalty against the killer
of their relative. Presumably, this would eliminate (or at least ame-
liorate) the stigma caused by differential prosecutorial treatment
based on race.
Standing, then, is not a problem where the black victim's family
seeks the death penalty. There is, however, a substantive barrier
to the family's claim, tied to the remedy that they seek. Where
the violation consists of the overvaluation of other lives, the Equal
Protection Clause does not authorize an order requiring the prose-
cutor to seek the death penalty. Rather, the only proper remedy
is to commute the death sentences of killers whose victims' lives
were overvalued. It is true that either remedy would achieve equal-
ity. But where overvaluation of victims' lives is the problem, the
Equal Protection Clause authorizes only a "leveling down"-here,
commutation of death sentences. By the same token, when under-
valuation is the problem, the clause authorizes only "leveling
up"-imposition of the death penalty or damages.
This requires explanation. In every equal protection case where
a governmental benefit has been denied a disfavored class, the
court faces the choice in designing a remedy of extending the ben-
efit to that class, or denying the benefit to all.1"6 It is sometimes
06 See Welsh v United States, 398 US 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J, concurring in result).
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said that courts finding equal protection violations have discretion
to choose their preferred remedy, and that the presumptive rem-
edy is to extend the benefit to all. °7 The Supreme Court's deci-
sions clearly indicate, however, that this is incorrect. Instead, the
proper remedy is determined by the ex ante intent of the legisla-
ture, or other government actor, that established or dispensed the
benefit in the first place. The court is required to ascertain whether
the governmental actor, blinded to the impermissible consider-
ation, would have treated everybody at the favored group's level
or the disfavored group's level. If the actor would have treated
everybody at the favored group's level, then the disfavored group
must be brought up to that level. If the actor would have treated
everyone at the disfavored group's level, then the favored group
must be brought down." 8 Furthermore, this intent must be deter-
mined at the time the benefit was dispensed or the program estab-
lished, not after litigation.0 9 This limitation is especially important
when the relevant government actor is an individual rather than
a legislature, because while a legislature may of course eliminate
a benefits program at any time, even after litigation, and so ulti-
mately impose a "leveling down" solution on all, 10 permitting in-
dividuals to "choose a remedy" after litigation would in effect per-
mit defendants to nullify constitutional rights based on nothing
more than a promise to cease discriminating in the future.
In the context of discrimination in capital sentencing, the gov-
107 The source of this confusion might be, at least in part, some language in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Califano v Westcott, 443 US 76, 89-90 (1979), indicating that ordinarily
courts have treated the extension of benefits as the proper remedy.
' See Heckler v Mathews, 465 US 728, 738-39 and n 5 (1984); Califano, 443 US at 90;
id at 94 (Powell, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Miller v Albright, 118 S Ct
1428, 1448-49 (1998) (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment); Note, Evan Caminker, A
Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 Yale L J 1185, 1187-88 (1986)
("[t]he current remedial model requires courts to defer to the legislative branch and choose
the option that they believe the enacting legislature would have preferred had it known
that its intended discrimination was unlawful"). For example, if the legislature gave each
white person $100 and each non-white person nothing, the grant would violate equal pro-
tection. The relevant remedial question is how much the legislature-blinded to race-
would have given each citizen. The answer may be $100, nothing, or something in between.
If the answer is $100, then the court must award all non-white persons $100. If the answer
is nothing, then the court must prohibit the grant to white persons. If the answer is $50,
then the court must prohibit the state from giving white persons anything more than $50,
and it must award all non-white persons $50.
"°Id at 1188 n 9.
"° Compare Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217 (1971).
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ernmental actor is the prosecutor. If, blinded to the victim's race,
he would not have sought the death penalty against a particular
defendant, then the proper remedy is to "level down"-that is,
commute the defendant's sentence to life. If, blinded to the vic-
tim's race, he would have sought the death penalty against a defen-
dant, then the proper remedy is to "level up." Ideally, this would
consist of requiring the prosecutor to seek the death penalty, but
because of practical problems, it may only consist of damages to
the victim's family."'
In Cell 2, the violation is one of overvaluing white victims' lives.
By definition, the prosecutors in those cases would not have sought
the death penalty if they had ignored race. The correct remedy
would be to commute any death sentences that were imposed in
those cases. Thus the families in Cell 2 are not entitled to the
remedy they seek, which is for the prosecutor to seek the death
penalty against the killer of their loved one. This raises an interest-
ing further question: Would an altruistic black family have stand-
ing to seek the commutation of the death sentences of killers
whose white victims' lives were overvalued? The answer is no.
There is nothing to differentiate one black victim's family from
any other. In each of their cases, the prosecutor properly decided
not to seek the death penalty. Their identical stigmatic injuries are
caused by prosecutors elsewhere improperly deciding to seek the
death penalty where the victims are white. The claim presents a
"generalized grievance" falling outside the scope of Article III.
Here, Allen v Wright is directly on point."2 Clearly, the proper
persons to seek commutation are the condemned defendants.
C. UNDERVALUATION OF THE LIVES OF BLACK VICTIMS-
DEFENDANT SEEKS COMMUTATION
In Cell 3, the killer of a white person seeks to have his death
sentence commuted on the ground that similarly situated killers
of blacks receive life sentences. Cell 3 assumes that the life of the
white victim has been properly valued, whereas the lives of simi-
larly situated black victims have been undervalued.
We conclude that a defendant lacks standing to pursue such a
.. See Part IV.D.
"' See notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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claim because of the second element of the standing inquiry-cau-
sation. The defendant's injury is the death sentence, yet it was not
caused by the undervaluation of the lives of black victims. There-
fore, the defendant has no standing to seek commutation on the
basis of the undervaluation of black lives. The defendant might
portray his injury differently in an effort to create standing, but
changing the injury also changes the remedy. The defendant might
claim that his injury is not the death sentence itself, but rather
being sentenced to death under a system that employs an arbitrary
classification-race. Assuming that the courts would recognize
such an injury,113 he would now have standing. However, he would
not have standing to seek commutation. He would have standing
only to seek resentencing under a nonarbitrary process. The
proper remedy in this scenario is for him to be resentenced to
death as part of a process that sentences all similarly situated killers
of black victims to death. In theory, at least, this would be a hollow
victory.114
Finally, even if the killer of a white did have standing to seek
commutation of his death sentence based on the undervaluation
of black victims' lives, he would run into the same remedial diffi-
culties discussed in Cell 2.115 Since the constitutional violation
identified by the defendant is undervaluation, the proper remedy
is "leveling up," which is to say, sentencing killers of blacks to
death, because by definition that is what prosecutors would have
done if blinded to race. However, this remedy is not what the de-
fendant is seeking, and helps him not at all.
D. UNDERVALUATION OF BLACK VICTIMS' LIVES-
POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR FAMILY
In Cell 4, the prosecutor undervalues the life of a black victim,
and the victim's family seeks redress. Standing is not a barrier, for
113 The extremely brief discussion of standing in McCleskey suggests that such an injury
is cognizable, 481 US at 291-92 n 8, but serious questions might be raised about whether
the current Court would consider such an injury sufficiently "concrete." See, e.g., Lujan
v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 572-73 (1992).
14 In practice, this remedy might be of some value to the defendant because of delays
inherent in litigation.
i15 See Part l.B.
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the reasons discussed in Cell 2.116 It is possible to imagine at least
four different remedies in this situation, all problemmatic: an in-
junction to prevent future discrimination against black victims;
allowing the victim's family to intervene in the penalty phase of
the murder trial to seek the death penalty; damages against the
prosecutor; and damages against the governmental unit employing
the prosecutor.
1. Injunction. The victim's family could seek an injunction pro-
hibiting discrimination against future black murder victims. The
family could proceed individually or on behalf of the class of future
black murder victims. Of course, any injunction would come too
late to help the family's murdered relative. But, if the death penalty
deters, it could help prevent future murders.
Such an attempt to secure injunctive relief would face daunting
justiciability problems. The injunction would require prosecutors
to pursue the death penalty in cases where they would otherwise
be disinclined to seek it. Moreover, the lawsuit would be moot as
to the victim. The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doc-
trine would not apply because the same victim can never be mur-
dered again.'1 ' Although the family members are themselves poten-
tial murder victims, this is equally true of every black person in
the jurisdiction. The family members can demonstrate no particu-
larized injury in terms of future harm, and the Court has stated
unequivocally that generalized grievances fall outside the scope of
judicial power under Article IlI.1I"
..6 See Part I.B. Remember that to state a cognizable claim, the family's alleged injury
cannot be failure to punish its relative's killer, simipliciter, but rather it must be the stigma
created by unequal treatment of their relative.
117 See DeFunis v Odegaard, 416 US 312 (1974), in which a rejected law school applicant
sued to gain admission on the ground that the school's affirmative action policy discrimi-
nated against him on the basis of race. The trial court ordered him admitted, and he matric-
ulated during appeals. During oral argument to the Supreme Court, counsel for the school
admitted that the plaintiff would receive his degree no matter how the Court ultimately
ruled. The Court held that the case was moot and did not fall within the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception because the plaintiff himself "will never again be
required to run the gantlet of the Law School's admission process, and so the question is
certainly not 'capable of repetition' so far as he is concerned." Id at 319. The Court has
since reaffirmed that the relevant question concerns the possibility of recurrence with re-
spect to the complaining party, not others similarly situated. See Weinstein v Bradford, 423
US 147, 149 (1975); Murphy v Hunt, 455 US 478, 482 (1982).
"' See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992). The Court recently held that
the prohibition against generalized grievances extends only to abstract injuries, not concrete
ones. See Federal Election Coim'n v Akins, 118 S Ct 1777 (1998). It seems likely that the
Court would find stigma more abstract than concrete.
[1998
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2. Intervention. Can the victim's family intervene in the penalty
phase of the murder trial to compel the prosecution to seek the
death penalty? We begin with a sketch of what such an interven-
tion procedure might entail. The prosecutor would be required to
announce a certain amount of time before trial whether he intends
to seek the death penalty. The announcement of a decision not to
seek the death penalty would trigger a brief period during which
the black victim's next of kin would request a court order requiring
the prosecutor to seek the death penalty. The trial court would
then review the relevant statistical and other evidence to decide
whether, if the victim had been white, the prosecutor would have
sought the death penalty. If the court decides in the affirmative,
then it would order the prosecutor to seek the death penalty.
The advantage of this procedure is obvious. The intervention
is on behalf of a specific murder victim, not "all black victims,"
or "all potential black victims," and it cannot be denied that there
exists a genuine, sharply defined "case or controversy" between
the victim's family and the prosecutor." 9 But intervention would
cause intolerable delays. In order to decide whether the prosecutor
had discriminated against the victim on the basis of race, the trial
court would need to know the precise circumstances surrounding
the killing. This would entail a mini-trial. Moreover, the court
would have to consider the relevant statistical evidence and enter-
tain argument regarding the charge of discrimination. Capital liti-
gation is lengthy enough as it is. An intervention procedure is sim-
ply impracticable. 2 '
3. Damages. Another possible remedy would be to allow the vic-
tim's family or the victim's estate damages from the prosecutor.
9 The prosecutor's failure to seek the death penalty creates a race-based difference in
treatment that directly stigmatizes the family as well as the victim. See Part 1V.B.
20 Intervention proceedings could also hamper the prosecution's ultimate effort to obtain
a conviction. Presumably the victim's family would want to call the prosecutor as an adverse
witness during the intervention proceedings, or at least to cross-examine the prosecutor on
his or her assertions. Not only would this distract the prosecutor from his or her trial
preparation, it might also provide ammunition for the murder defendant. If the prosecutor
testifies, the victim's family would offer all available impeachment evidence. Some of this
evidence might prove embarrassing or outright damaging in the murder trial, or in any
penalty phase that might ensue. On the other hand, if the intervention statute prohibits
the victim's family from calling the prosecutor as an adverse witness, or prohibits them
from cross-examination, it unfairly hamstrings the intervention effort. Still another problem
with intervention is psychological. Formal and protracted adversary proceedings pitting the
victim's family against the prosecutor are bound to dampen the prosecutor's zeal in ob-
taining "justice" for the victim.
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But the Supreme Court has held that prosecutors acting in their
official capacity are absolutely immune from damages actions un-
der Section 1983, so this remedy is currently unavailable.'21
Could the victim's family or the victim's estate seek damages
from the governmental unit employing the prosecutor? In Monell
v Department of Social Services,'22 the Court ruled that a municipal-
ity is liable for damages under Section 1983 if the plaintiff demon-
strates that a municipal custom or policy caused the violation. The
municipality may not be held liable under a respondeat superior
theory. Would a prosecutor's decision not to seek the death pen-
alty on the basis of the victim's race constitute a "custom or pol-
icy" within the meaning of Monell?
The leading case in favor of characterizing such a decision as
a "custom or policy" is Pembaur v City of Cincinnati.'23 A county
prosecutor had instructed police to make an unconstitutional entry
into a physician's clinic. The physician sued for damages under
Section 1983. The Court held that the single decision of the prose-
cutor-who had authority under state law to decide whether the
officers should enter-"may fairly be said to represent official pol-
icy.' '1 24 By analogy, the family of a black murder victim would ar-
gue that the prosecutor, having authority to decide what criteria
should be employed in deciding whether to seek the death penalty,
makes discriminatory policy every time he elects not to seek the
death penalty because of the victim's race.
Since Pembaur, however, the Court has cut back on the situa-
tions in which the action of a municipal employee constitutes "cus-
tom or policy." 2 ' As one commentator has noted, "In all of the
decisions following Monell, the Justices seem to be trying to limit
local government liability to those situations in which fault can be
attributed not simply to an individual officer but to the govern-
mental entity itself." 126 In Bd. of County Commissioners of Bryan
121 Butz v Economou, 438 US 478 (1978). Congress could, of course, eliminate prosecutors'
immunity from damages, but it seems unlikely to do so.
122 436 US 658 (1978).
123 475 US 469 (1986).
124 Pembaur, 475 US at 480.
M2 See, e.g., City ofSt. Louis v Praprotnik, 485 US 112 (1988) (state law determines who
is a policymaking official); City ofCanton v Harris, 489 US 378 (1989) (municipal liability
for "failure to train" only where officials harbored "deliberate indifference" to citizens).
'26 Richard H. Fallon et al, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
1131 (4th ed 1996).
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County v Brown,127 for example, the plaintiff was a passenger in a
car that had been chased by police. When a deputy sheriff ordered
her out of the vehicle, she refused. He then pulled her out so vio-
lently that she suffered severe and permanent damage to both
knees. She sued the county on the theory that the sheriff had failed
adequately to review the deputy's background before hiring him.
As it turned out, the deputy-who was the sheriff's nephew's
son-had previously pleaded guilty to several offenses, including
assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness. The
Court nonetheless rejected municipal liability. Specifically, a re-
view of the deputy's criminal record would not have provided suf-
ficient reason for the sheriff to conclude that the deputy's use of
excessive force would be a "plainly obvious consequence of the
hiring decision." '128 More generally, the Court emphasized the
need to find aggravated mental culpability before imposing munic-
ipal liability:
As our Section 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illus-
trates ... it is not enough for a Section 1983 plaintiff merely
to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality.
The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate
conduct, the municipality was the "moving force" behind the
injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal
action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and
must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal
action and the deprivation of federal rights.'29
As we recognized in Monell and have repeatedly reaffirmed,
Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless
deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused
a deprivation of federal rights.3°
Most prosecutorial discrimination against victims is probably
unconscious. If Brown means that no municipal liability shall be
imposed for anything less than "deliberate" or "intentional"
wrongdoing, then municipal liability would ordinarily be unavail-
able to families of victims. Brown may not, however, stand for that
1 117 S Ct 1382 (1997).
28Id at 1392 (footnote omitted).
129 Id at 1388.
130 Id at 1394.
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proposition. In City of Canton v Harris,13' the Court seemed to at-
tribute great significance to the difference between active malfea-
sance and nonfeasance. The plaintiff in Harris had alleged that the
city's failure to train its personnel properly caused her injury. The
Court stated that a "failure to train" theory would withstand chal-
lenge only "where the failure .. .amounts to deliberate indifference
to the rights of persons with whom the police come into con-
tact."' Like Harris, Brown was a case of nonfeasance-failure to
screen."I It may be that culpability must rise to the level of "delib-
erate" or "intentional" only in these nonfeasance cases, and that
the fault standard in cases of malfeasance is lower. 34 Therefore, it
is unclear under existing law whether a victim's family could obtain
damages. For these reasons, it is our view that Congress should
expressly amend Section 1983 to authorize such relief.
Where the governmental unit employing the prosecutor is a
state rather than a municipality, there are additional procedural
hurdles. The Court has held that states are not "persons" within
the meaning of Section 1983 when being sued for retrospective
relief such as damages."' Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment
generally bars federal courts from awarding damages against states
in federal court.'36 Congress should amend Section 1983 to make
states "persons" for the limited purpose of damages in prosecu-
torial discrimination cases. It should also use its authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states' Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity in prosecutorial discrim-
13 489 US 378 (1989).
"I Id at 388 (emphasis added).
133 For purposes of this article, we assume that it is both possible and sensible to distin-
guish between cases of malfeasance and cases of nonfeasance. This assumption may be
improvident. Harris might well be characterized as a case of actively culpable administration,
just as Brown could be viewed as a case of reckless hiring. Justice Frankfurter once admon-
ished the Court for insisting upon "Year-Book distinctions between feasance and nonfea-
sance-a distinction that may have significance in the evolution of common-law notions
of liability, but is inadmissible as a line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality."
Lambert v California, 355 US 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting). Discussion of this
problem, however, would divert us from our more immediate objective of exploring possible
remedies for prosecutorial discrimination against victims.
134 Although the Court has squarely held that mere negligence does not rise to the level
of a Due Process violation. See Daniels v Williams, 474 US 327 (1986); Davidson v Cannon,
474 US 344 (1986).
13 See Will v Michigan Dept of State Police, 491 US 58 (1989).
136 See Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651 (1974).
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ination cases.137 Finally, Congress should waive federal sovereign
immunity in cases alleging prosecutorial discrimination against vic-
tims on the basis of race in federal capital cases.
What are the final results of our matrix analysis? In Cell 1, we
found that a defendant whose white victim's life was overvalued
has both first- and (probably) third-party standing to seek commu-
tation of his death sentence. He is better off asserting the equal
protection rights of undervalued black murder victims because
such a claim would trigger strict scrutiny; the claim based on his
own equal protection rights would be reviewed for a rational basis
only. In Cell 2, we found that the family of a black victim has
standing to seek the death penalty based on the overvaluation of
white lives, but that imposition of the death penalty is the wrong
remedy. The proper remedy for overvaluation of white lives is to
commute the death sentences of the murderers of white victims-
a remedy that the family of a black victim has neither standing
nor incentive to seek. In Cell 3, we found that the condemned
murderer of a white person does not have standing to seek com-
mutation of his death sentence based on the undervaluation of
black lives in other cases, and in any event, commutation is not
the proper remedy for such a violation. He may have standing to
insist upon being resentenced to death by a process that sentences
similarly situated killers of blacks to death, but such a remedy does
him little good. In Cell 4, we concluded that the family of a black
victim should be able to sue the relevant governmental unit for
undervaluation of its relative's life. We argued that Congress
should amend Section 1983 to allow damages against municipali-
ties and states in cases of prosecutorial discrimination against vic-
tims, and that Congress should waive federal sovereign immunity
in such cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Devising a remedial scheme for race-of-the-victim discrimi-
nation in capital sentencing is difficult, but not impossible. The
"'See Fitzpatrick v Biter, 427 US 445 (1976) (Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment
authorized Congress to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity with
respect to Title VII actions). Congress's abrogation powers pursuant to the Civil War
amendments survived the decision holding that Congress has no authority to abrogate pur-
suant to Article I. See Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44 (1996).
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most promising solutions would be to allow defendants who mur-
der whites to seek commutation of their sentences, and families of
black victims to seek damages against the governmental units that
employ prosecutors who discriminate. Each of these claimants
could rely entirely on statistical evidence to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination. Once the claimant has carried this burden,
the burden should shift to the prosecutor to articulate a legitimate,
nonracial rationale for seeking the death penalty in that particular
case. If the prosecutor offers such a reason, the claimant should
bear the ultimate burden of persuasion. To make these solutions
work, several reforms are required. The Supreme Court should
reinterpret the "intent" requirement of Washington v Davis and
Arlington Heights to mean that the result would have been different
if the race of the affected party had been different, and should
permit the use of statistical evidence to establish this "causation"
requirement. Moreover, Congress should amend Section 1983 to
permit damages actions against governmental entities whose prose-
cutors discriminate on the basis of the victim's race.
This proposal would improve the law. The Baldus and similar
studies prove that prosecutors discriminate based on the race of
murder victims. For courts and legislatures simply to shrug their
shoulders and say nothing can be done fosters cynicism and disre-
spect for the criminal justice system.
[1998
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